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Robert Looney
We will defeat [the terrorists] by expanding and encouraging world trade.
—President George W. Bush
This is a contest for the soul of Islam. Only Muslims will determine the outcome, but we 
can help.
—Robert Zoellick, former US Trade Representative
The events of 11 September made it painfully clear that the political, social, 
and economic problems of other countries have a direct impact on American 
national security. While the roots of terrorism are complex, it’s safe to say 
that the United States was attacked by a criminal organization that in large 
part has had great success in recruiting new members in nations that offer 
young men little political voice and limited economic opportunity.1
Even before the smoke had settled from the 11 September attacks in 
New York and Washington, DC, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick 
launched a series of speeches arguing that global trade liberalization was a 
central plank of the counteroffensive against terrorism. In a thoughtful essay, 
“Countering Terror with Trade,” Zoellick’s main premise was as follows:
America’s trade leadership can build a coalition of countries. . . . Open 
markets are vital for developing nations, many of them fragile democra-
cies that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty and cre-
1. For a good overview of the issues, see Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Some Roots of Terror-
ism,” Population and Environment 24, no. 2 (2002).
Robert Looney is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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ate opportunity; we need answers for those who ask for economic hope to 
counter internal threats to our common values. To address the relationship 
between trade agreements and other international objectives, the president 
has proposed that we build on openness and growth in developing coun-
tries with a toolbox of cooperative policies.2
As Alan Tonelson also notes, “Trade policy as antiterror weapon is an 
understandably appealing idea. It doesn’t put American soldiers in harm’s 
way. It is nonviolent, market friendly, and holds the promise of ‘draining the 
swamp’ where terrorists are assumed to thrive. And it doesn’t require a line 
in the federal budget.”3 
This logic was compelling enough to ensure that a large section of the cur-
rent National Security Strategy of the United States be devoted to the means 
of expanding US trade with developing countries.
A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing pros-
perity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by 
free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows 
people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform 
and the fi ght against corruption, and reinforces the habits of liberty.4
The use of trade as a weapon against terrorism is not without its critics. 
In question is the basic assumption that trade with the United States auto-
matically provides workers in developing countries with rising incomes and 
standards of living. Some critics of the administration’s trade policies go as 
far as to note that “shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush 
administration speculated that trade policy could help fi ght terrorism. The 
theory is good—but in practice, current trade policy is at best irrelevant to 
the terror campaign, and at worst working against it.”5
Trade is not the only economic approach to be used by the United States in 
the war on terrorism. Foreign assistance is seen by many as superior to trade 
in contributing to the war on terrorism through its ability to win new allies by 
2. Washington Post, 20 September 2001.
3. Alan Tonelson, “There’s Only So Much That Foreign Trade Can Do,” Washington Post, 2 June 
2002, B1.
4. National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, Offi ce of the White House, 17 
September 2002, at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss6.html.
5. Ed Gresser, “Aiding Muslim Economies,” DLC Blueprint Magazine, 15 April 2003.
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focusing on humanitarian relief for refugees. It could be more tightly focused 
on eradicating poverty by facilitating higher rates of economic growth in key 
regional countries.
As with trade, however, aid has also had its share of critics. The testimony 
of Marc A. Miles before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives paints a telling picture: 
Experience has demonstrated that development assistance (i.e., government-
to-government assistance intended to catalyze development in poor nations) 
is not a key factor in increasing economic growth in underdeveloped coun-
tries. On the contrary, development assistance has often proved to be 
counterproductive. Whether it is skimmed off by corruption, kept beyond 
the reach of poorer inhabitants due to regulations, or access is denied due 
to a lack of property rights or rigid credit markets, traditional aid usually 
fails to reach those below the top rungs. The lack of lasting impact is a 
demonstrable fact.6
In this essay I focus on the US economic strategy of using trade as a 
weapon in the war on terrorism.7 From a theoretical perspective, expanded 
trade would appear to be capable of suffi ciently improving the lives of poten-
tial terrorist recruits as to signifi cantly lessen the attraction of al Qaeda and 
like-minded groups. At issue then is whether specifi c trade programs can 
be made suffi ciently fl exible, adaptable, and controllable so that they are 
capable of quickly bringing tangible benefi ts to targeted groups. If not, trade 
initiatives could actually undermine the war on terrorism. In a fi nal section I 
outline several suggestions for making trade policy a more potent weapon in 
the war on terrorism.
Trade and Aid in the US National Security Strategy
US foreign economic policy is formally outlined in the National Security 
Strategy of the United States.8 Areas relating to trade and of particular rel-
6. See www.house.gov/international_relations/108/mile022604.htm.
7. For an earlier assessment of the Pakistani case, see Robert Looney “Problems in Using Inter-
national Trade to Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan,” Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies 26, no. 4 (2003): 1–10.
8. National Security Strategy of the United States.
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evance to the Middle East and the war on terrorism include the following 
directives:
1. Seize the global initiative: The United States will attempt to move the 
current World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha global trade round to 
completion. Progress toward this goal is problematic in light of the failure 
of the WTO ministerial meeting (10–15 September 2003) in Cancun. That 
meeting was intended to focus on the needs of the developing countries but 
collapsed in the face of fundamental differences between rich and poor 
nations.9 
2. Press for regional initiatives: Perhaps because of the diffi culties in 
bringing the current WTO round to a conclusion, the United States has 
begun to place more emphasis on regional trade initiatives such as the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas and an additional free trade area with the 
Central American countries. The United States is also pursuing initiatives 
in Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, essentially 
leading to free trade with the sub-Saharan countries. Most importantly for 
the issues at hand, the United States is also attempting to create a Middle 
East free trade area (MEFTA) enjoying free trade with the United States.
3. Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements: As a step toward the 
creation of a MEFTA, the United States is signing a series of bilateral free 
trade deals with various Middle Eastern and North African countries, like 
the one it has with Israel. The fi rst of these is the free-trade agreement 
signed with Jordan in 2001, followed by agreements with Morocco and 
Bahrain in 2004.10 Negotiations are currently at one stage or another with 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Egypt.11 The US strategy 
in the Middle East is a graduated one: negotiating bilateral trade agree-
ments country-by-country before moving toward a regional agreement to 
be completed in 2013.12 In other parts of the world the United States has 
9. Robert Looney, “The Cancun Conundrum: What Future for the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)?” Journal of Third World Studies 21, no. 2 (2004): 127–46.
10. Jeffrey Sparshott, “Bahrain, US Ink Accord on Trade,” Washington Times, 15 September 
2004.
11. “Bush Kicks Off New Round of Free-Trade Talks in the Middle East,” Agence France-Presse, 
11 March 2005.
12. Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung, “Bush Calls Trade Key to Mideast,” Washington Post, 10 May 
2003, A1.
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completed free-trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, and Australia. In 
short, the administration’s aim is to achieve free-trade agreements with a 
mix of developed and developing countries in all parts of the world.
4. Promote the connection between trade and development: Underlying 
US trade initiatives is the belief that trade policies can help developing 
countries strengthen property rights, competition, the rule of law, invest-
ment, the spread of knowledge, open societies, the effi cient allocation of 
resources, and regional integration—all leading to growth, opportunity, 
and confi dence in countries’ abilities to grow and prosper. 
Middle East Free-Trade Areas: Factors Impeding Success
The creation of individual free-trade areas (FTAs) that eventually merge 
into a grand MEFTA is an ambitious plan, one that takes the United States 
into largely uncharted waters. While the US National Security Strategy has 
identifi ed the correct elements of a trade-based strategy toward assisting 
growth and development, designing a specifi c blueprint for the region is quite 
another matter. Several questions arise concerning the impact a group of 
FTAs (and eventually a MEFTA) might have on the region. The most funda-
mental among them is whether the region is ready to move to free trade with 
the United States. Would such a venture only create more dislocation and 
uncertainty—an improved breeding ground for terrorism? 
The one thing most observers agree on is the magnitude of the problem—
by most of the standard metrics, the countries in the region are currently ill 
prepared to thrive in the global economic system. A litany of indicators docu-
ments the weakness of the region’s linkages to the world economy, among 
them the fact that import tariffs average over 20 percent.13 Most of the larger 
countries in the region are not members of the WTO, the international agency 
largely responsible for reducing trade barriers and reconciling disputes over 
trade practices. Perhaps even more telling, the region’s share of world exports 
has fallen steadily even as the region as a whole attracts roughly as much 
foreign direct investment as Sweden.14
13. The average for those countries can be found in the United Nation’s Economic and Social Com-
mission for Western Asia countries (ESCWA).
14. Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, “Islam, Globalization, and Economic Performance in the 
Middle East,” Institute for International Economics Policy Brief PB04-4, June 2004.
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Structural Problems within the Region
These patterns refl ect a number of underlying structural factors that have 
constrained the region’s competitiveness in international markets over the 
past several decades.15
1. Massive population increases: The Middle East and North Africa had a 
population of 112 million in 1950. The population is well over 415 million 
today. Most likely it will more than double again, reaching at least 833 
million by 2050.
2. A youth explosion, especially in the twenty-to-twenty-four age bracket: 
This is the key age group for new job entrants and has grown steadily 
from 10 million in 1950 to 36 million today. Growth is expected to remain 
steady, reaching at least 56 million by 2050.
3. A failure to achieve global competitiveness, diversify economies, and cre-
ate productive jobs: Direct and disguised unemployment ranges from 12 
to 20 percent in many countries. The high percentage of the population 
entering the labor force only compounds this problem.
4. A steady decline in nonpetroleum exports: These exports have declined 
as a percentage of world trade over the past half century, and an equal 
pattern of decline is evident in regional gross domestic product as a share 
of global GDP.
5. Overurbanization: A half century decline in agricultural and traditional 
trades have imposed high levels of stress on traditional social safety nets 
and extended families. The urban population was under 15 million in 
1950. It has since more than doubled, from 84 million in 1980 to 173 mil-
lion today, and some 25 percent of the population will soon live in cities of 
1 million or more.
6. Broad problems in integrating women effectively and productively into 
the work force: While female employment in the Middle East–North Afri-
can (MENA) region has grown in recent years, it still averages 15 percent 
lower than in high growth areas, such as East Asia.
15. Anthony H. Cordesman, Beyond Anger and Counterterrorism: A New Grand Strategy for US 
and Arab Relations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 September 
2004).
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7. Growing pressures on young men and women: Young people of the Mid-
dle East and North Africa emigrate to Europe and the United States to 
fi nd jobs and economic opportunities—a process that inevitably creates 
new tensions and adjustment problems.
8. Little regional trade: Almost all nations in the region have as their 
major trading partners economies outside the region. Increased intrare-
gional trade offers little or no comparative advantage.
9. Increasing water scarcity: Much of the region cannot afford to provide 
more water for agriculture at market prices—many countries have become 
permanent importers of food.
10. Failed or inadequate growth in infrastructure: Growth has been sty-
mied in key areas like housing and education.
Limited Progress in Governance and Economic Reform
The Middle East region lags considerably behind other parts of the world in 
various aspects of economic liberalization and governance. In particular a 
signifi cant gap exists across all measures of governance between MENA and 
non-MENA countries. While the MENA countries have closed this gap a bit 
in recent years, it is still striking in the area of voice (the participatory pro-
cess of decision making) and accountability.
On the other hand, the MENA countries compare fairly favorably to non-
MENA countries in several areas of economic freedom16—monetary policy, 
regulation, and the size of the informal (black) market. Still, the region’s 
trade policies, government intervention, foreign investment, and fl exibility in 
wages and prices lag behind other parts of the world. Even worse, there is 
little evidence that for the region as a whole this gap has narrowed in recent 
years.17
16. Data are from the Index of Economic Freedom Rankings (Washington, DC: Heritage Founda-
tion, various issues).
17. Documented in Robert Looney, “Reform Initiatives for Iraq and the Middle East: The Search 
for What Works,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 1 (2004): 1–33.
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Distance from the United States
Another problem confronting the creation of a MEFTA is simply that of dis-
tance. For some time, economists have discounted the distance factor, often 
citing declines in transport costs, improved communications, and the like. 
Recent research, however, suggests that distance may still be a key factor in 
affecting trade patterns. First, transport costs are higher for longer distances. 
Second, the costs of accessing information about foreign markets and estab-
lishing a trade relationship in those markets are higher for longer distances. 
In fact, despite the “death of distance” associated with the communications 
revolution, proximity appears to be increasingly important for trade fl ows.
A major study focused on international trade by individual states has 
found that trade has become relatively more intense with nearby partners as 
opposed to distant countries.18 US state trade shares with Mexico, Canada, 
and Latin America have increased while shares with Europe, Asia, Africa, 
and Oceania have decreased. Refl ecting the change in trade shares, the dis-
tance of trade for the aggregate of states has declined. The North American 
Free Trade Area in particular has had a fairly signifi cant effect on the geo-
graphic distribution of state exports. In fact, distance alone may neutralize 
many of the perceived benefi ts of FTAs. It is estimated that depending on the 
type of good, a distance of one thousand miles is equivalent to having to pay 
import tariffs of between 7 percent and 17 percent. The example of Chile is 
instructive. Even with an FTA with the United States, it is estimated that at 
best Chile will move in the Remoteness Scale19 from a ranking of sixty-two 
out of sixty-eight countries to fi fty-nine.
The notion of economic proximity is mostly, as Nobel laureate economist 
Douglas North has emphasized, about “transactions costs.” Countries with 
less regulation, stronger private sectors, leaner bureaucracies, less red tape, 
more transparent political systems, and greater protection of property rights 
have lower transaction costs and thus greater “proximity” to global markets 
18. Cletus C. Coughlin, “The Increasing Importance of Proximity for Exports from the United 
States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 86, no. 6 (2004): 1–18.
19. Bernardo Blum and Ed Leamer, “Can an FTA Suspend the Law of Gravity and Give the Ameri-
cas Higher Growth and Better Income Distribution?” at emlab.berkeley.edu/users/obstfeld/e281_
sp03/leamer.pdf.
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than countries with distorted economies and glutted bureaucracies.20 Coun-
tries that share institutional frameworks—such as similar judiciary sys-
tems—or have a common language are “closer” to each other than countries 
that do not. Finally, an educated work force, one that can communicate easily 
in the modern languages of technology, helps.21 
To take maximum advantage of a MEFTA with the United States, the Mid-
dle East countries will have to work on implementing the type of policies 
that will remove remoteness. So far this idea has not been well recognized in 
the region—as noted above, the region as a whole lags considerably behind 
most other parts of the world in making progress in key reform areas. Even 
more telling, recent years have seen little or no progress in improved market 
reforms, economic freedom, or supporting governance institutions in many of 
the region’s key countries.22
Limited Ability of Trade to Initiate Reform
Despite the lack of signifi cant progress in reform in the region, might we 
expect freer trade to exert the right pressures to initiate a series of follow-
on reforms? The use of trade incentives is a long-standing US policy. Espe-
cially during the Cold War, trade and access to the US market was used 
to strengthen allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, and on a smaller 
scale, a host of other friendly governments. Implicit in this strategy was the 
belief that improved trade and incomes would set in motion a virtuous circle 
of further economic and governance reforms as countries sought to improve 
effi ciency and competitiveness. In turn, improved economic effi ciency and 
governance further expanded the economy’s gains from trade. 
What happened in practice? Virtuous circles or something closely resem-
bling them were attained in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Costa Rica, where the preexisting social and political conditions were more 
or less conducive to development and—at least eventually—democracy. On 
the other hand, only very limited successes were achieved in countries such 
20. Sebastian Edwards, “How Chile Can Make the Most of Its US Trade Deal,” Wall Street Journal, 
3 January 2003, A11.
21. Ibid.
22. Looney, “Reform Initiatives for Iraq and the Middle East,” 1–33.
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as Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where the preexisting 
conditions were less amenable to economic and political liberalism.23 Pete 
Moore and Andrew Schrank go as far as to conclude the following:
In fact, the lessons of history are clear. Trade alone will tend to under-
pin—rather than to undermine—preexisting social and political arrange-
ments. . . . If trade and aid are offered conditionally (i.e., as a quid pro 
quo for political or foreign policy reform), they risk igniting a nationalist, 
anti-American, and quite possibly Islamist backlash—particularly if the 
conditions are perceived to benefi t the United States or Israel rather than 
Arab fi rms, investors, and citizens. If they are offered unconditionally, 
however, they threaten to do little more than enrich already powerful and 
self-serving elites and to thereby undermine the prospects for peace and 
prosperity in the Middle East.24
The less successful countries’ diffi culties stem from the fact that there 
seem to be only limited linkages between freer trade and the major dimen-
sions of governance.25 This fi nding was confi rmed through a statistical analy-
sis of a large sample of developing countries.26 Specifi cally, using a classifi -
cation analysis of 162 countries,27 trade linkages were found to occur only in 
the areas of (a) overall governance,28 (b) regulatory quality, and (c) voice and 
accountability.
Statistically, property rights not freer trade were found to be the controlling 
economic reform variable in effecting progress toward improved governance. 
The progression is steady, with higher mean values of property rights associ-
ated with a higher attainment of overall governance. Within this progression 
23. Pete W. Moore and Andrew Schrank, “Commerce and Confl ict: US Effort to Counter Terrorism 
with Trade May Backfi re,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 3 (2003).
24. Ibid.
25. Governance data is from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzazi, Governance 
Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003). Gover-
nance measures include voice, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, and control of corruption. 
26. A complete set of results are available from the author upon request.
27. For this purpose a classifi cation tree was developed. See AnswerTree 3.0 User’s Guide (Chi-
cago: SPSS, 2001) for a description of the program and logic underlying classifi cation trees.
28. An unweighted index of voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
political stability, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness for the years 2000 and 2002.
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of governance groups, (a) progress incorporating informal markets into the 
formal economy, (b) proper monetary policies (low infl ation), and (c) improve-
ments in banking and fi nance systems helped differentiate countries as to 
high or low overall governance. Improved trade policies played a lesser role.
Based on the overall attainment of good governance, several distinct 
groups of countries occur in the Middle East.29 The fi rst comprises mainly 
the smaller oil-rich Gulf countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, and 
Qatar, together with Israel. All have made good progress in overall good gov-
ernance. Another group consists of Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Tunisia (and possibly Morocco and Lebanon), which are somewhat further 
behind in governance reform. A fi nal group consists of Algeria, Pakistan, 
Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia, all well below the norm 
for good governance.
Trade policies are useful in effecting the quality of regulation, but again 
not the dominant factor in this regard. As with overall good governance, 
property rights are again the most important aspect of economic reform asso-
ciated with improved regulatory quality.
Finally, a similar pattern is associated with voice and accountability, with 
trade policy as a secondary factor (separating Iran from countries with poorer 
trade policies, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia). One interesting aspect of voice and 
accountability was the particularly low scores attained by the Middle East 
countries.
Middle East FTAs: Some Practical Concerns
This discussion raises a number of concerns over the effectiveness of FTAs in 
the Middle East region. Structural impediments, lack of progress in economic 
and governance reform, distance from the US market, and the unlikelihood 
of trade initiating follow-on policies to improve the overall economic environ-
ment cast doubts on the effectiveness of trade-based strategies in assisting in 
the war on terrorism.
29. A result produced using the classifi cation program cited in note 27.
Looney: US Middle East Economic Policy  113
Trade Diverted from Terrorist-Prone Countries
Unfortunately, one cannot even say with complete certainty whether the 
agreements are in the best economic interest of the individual Middle East-
ern countries. The classic argument against FTAs focuses on their trade-
creation versus trade-diversion effects. Trade creation occurs when produc-
tion is shifted from higher-cost producers to lower-cost producers within the 
trading bloc. When trade barriers are eliminated among the FTA countries, 
differences in comparative costs will lead to shifts in trade, production, and 
investment patterns that favor the lower-cost producers and improve economic 
effi ciency within the FTA.
On the other hand, trade diversion occurs when production is shifted to 
higher-cost internal producers from lower cost external producers. If trade 
diversion outweighs trade creation, an individual country within the FTA may 
fi nd itself worse off as a result of the agreement. This is unlikely to happen 
for the United States in the strict economic sense, since the actual volumes of 
trade are so small (the Moroccan economy is about the size of that of greater 
Albany, New York).30
Only a detailed statistical study can determine if trade diversion is a sig-
nifi cant problem for individual countries in the Middle East. On the other 
hand, it is fairly easy to speculate about the short-run impact on terrorism 
stemming from the trade creation/diversion process. If, as a result of the new 
FTAs, trade is shifted from high-terrorist-risk countries such as Pakistan or 
Turkey to relatively low-terrorist-threat ones such as Morocco or Jordan, then 
the FTA results in lost ground in the war on terrorism. Given the sequence 
of FTAs in the Middle East, there is a good chance of this happening, since 
only those countries already relatively stable after undertaking signifi cant 
reforms can qualify for FTA status: “Basically the administration is picking 
low-hanging fruit, where signifi cant reform already has been undertaken and 
the volume and nature of trade very simple.”31
30. Alan Tonelson, “Small Is Dumb, Not Beautiful, in Trade Policy,” 30 April 2002, at American-
EconomicAlert.org.
31. Quoted in Sparshott.
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Frictions with Allies
Even worse, a whole spectrum of US foreign policy interests (as well as those 
of major allies in the war on terrorism) can be undermined by the prolifera-
tion of FTAs in the Middle East and elsewhere. A good example of this is 
provided by the European Union’s strategic partnership with the Mediter-
ranean and Middle East, the Barcelona Process, initiated in 1995. In some 
regards this is a program similar to the US FTA initiatives. Specifi cally, the 
EU wants to achieve the “construction of a zone of shared prosperity through 
an economic and fi nancial partnership and the gradual establishment of a 
free trade zone.”32 The problem here is that the United States has announced 
that countries seeking free-trade agreements with the United States must 
cooperate with Washington on foreign policy and security issues.33 This puts 
many of the Middle East countries in the middle of US and EU disagree-
ments, distracting all parties from the war on terrorism. For example, until 
recently the United States was not considering moving ahead with an FTA 
with Egypt because that country refused to support the US WTO challenge 
to the EU’s de facto moratorium on genetically modifi ed food.34
Finally, the United States has said that FTAs would not affect existing 
regional trade agreements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
However, Saudi Arabia, a key US ally in the region, has taken a strong coun-
terposition, arguing that the recent FTA signed with Bahrain and the pros-
pects for one with the UAE would undermine the foundation of the GCC. In 
this regard, Prince Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, noted that “it 
is alarming to see some members of the GCC enter into separate bilateral 
agreements with international powers. . . . They diminish the collective bar-
gaining power and weaken not only the solidarity of the GCC as a whole but 
also each of its members.”35
32. Palestine Media Center, “The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Long-Standing 
Partnership,” 12 October 2004, at www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=2&id=772.
33. “WTO Suffers from New Security Agenda,” Oxford Analytica, 15 July 2003, 1.
34. Ibid.
35. Quoted in Linda Heard, “US Free Trade Agreements Split Arab Opinion,” Arab News, 8 March 
2005.
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Congressional Approval
A fi nal consideration entails the implementation of FTAs. While they may 
be relatively easy to negotiate, it may be diffi cult to obtain congressional 
approval. To overcome expected fi erce resistance from domestic agricultural, 
labor, and textile interests, the rest of the business community would have 
to organize a very large effort to support passage. With relatively small com-
mercial opportunities at stake, big business may not have the requisite incen-
tives to push hard.36 The embarrassment surrounding a failed attempt at FTA 
approval may only fuel further anti-Americanism in the affected country.
Phasing Out of Textile Quotas
To counter these arguments, proponents of FTAs in the Middle East often 
cite the success of Jordan. That country’s exports have increased from $31 
million in 1999 to $673 million in 2003.37 This fi gure is expected to top 
$800 million in 2004.38 However, these fi gures are a bit misleading in that 
they do not accurately refl ect the effects of the free-trade agreement with the 
United States. The lion’s share of Jordan’s increased exports came from the 
recent creation of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), specifi c areas whose 
outputs get duty-free and quota-free access to the US market if they are pro-
duced with at least 8 percent of Israeli inputs. These zones have attracted 
investment from Asian apparel manufacturers seeking to circumvent US 
quota restrictions. Because these manufacturers import most of their fabrics 
from Asia, job creation in Jordan has been minimal.39
In any case, with the end of the Multi-fi ber Agreement at the end of 2004 
and as worldwide quotas on garments are removed, the importance of Jor-
dan’s QIZs will fade. With the global removal of quotas, many companies will 
move their operations to low-cost countries such as China and India. Further 
complicating things for Jordan, on 14 December 2004 Egypt, Israel, and the 
36. “United States: Trade Strategy Meets Numerous Setbacks,” Oxford Analytica, 19 November 
2003, 1.
37. “Cash-Strapped Jordan Aims High,” AME Info, 11 December 2004, at www.ameinfo.com.
38. Oxford Business Group, “Jordan: Standing by Uncle Sam,” Online Briefi ng 77, no. 9 (2004), at 
www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/weekly01/asp?id=1441.
39. Debra Glassman, “Bush Tries to Recycle Cold War–Era Policy,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 1 
July 2003.
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United States signed a partial free-trade agreement creating QIZs in Egypt 
that will allow Egyptian-Israeli goods access to the US market. As a result, 
Egypt may capture much of Jordan’s apparel business, as Egyptian labor 
costs are lower and raw materials are more readily available.40 For Jordan to 
remain competitive in the clothing/apparel markets, the country will have to 
undertake major investments in its infrastructure at a time the government is 
severely short of funds.
Assessment
On the surface, the US economic policies toward the region appear to be 
based on sound economic theory and empirical fact—increased trade leads 
to rates of growth and incomes, together with lower unemployment rates, 
reduced poverty, and most likely reduced attractiveness of terrorism among 
the youth. However, sequence and end result implicitly assumes that a cer-
tain critical mass of institutions facilitating economic expansion is in place. 
In the Middle East this is likely to be the case for only a handful of coun-
tries—a number of the Persian Gulf oil economies together with Israel, Jor-
dan, and Turkey. Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia may not be at the point 
where expanded trade is capable of inducing improved governance structures 
capable of sustaining and expanding growth and trade. The rest of the coun-
tries are defi nitely not at this point and might even experience a vicious cir-
cle of expanded trade causing increased inequality, poverty, corruption, and 
anti-Americanism, leading to lower rates of investment and growth.
US economic policy also suffers from a fundamental inconsistency. In 
its rush to create FTAs around the world, it has become literally impossi-
ble to assess the impact on any one particular region. In fact, current US 
FTAs with other parts of the world may be shifting trade away from criti-
cal Middle Eastern countries. Countries in the Andean region, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and elsewhere, granted preferential, duty-free access to the US mar-
ket, have enjoyed a comparative boom, with exports to the United States ris-
ing nearly 40 percent in some cases.41 Again, these FTAs have the potential 
40. “Joint Industrial Zones Seen as Boon for Egypt,” Jerusalem Report, 27 December 2004.
41. Paul Blustein, “US Free-Trade Deals Include Few Muslim Countries,” Washington Post, 4 
December 2004.
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to signifi cantly shift trade away from the terrorist-prone countries to relatively 
peaceful areas of the world.
Still, the issue is not crystal clear. A recent report on a potential US-Egyptian 
free-trade agreement notes that such an arrangement would produce strong 
benefi ts for both countries as well as speed up economic reforms in Egypt.42 
Given its size, however, Egypt may be the exception to the rule in the region.
Given the limitations of an FTA-based strategy, the most constructive US 
trade policy is no doubt one of unilaterally opening up its economy to exports 
from the region.43 This is simply good economics. More importantly, with 
time as, one-by-one, the Middle Eastern countries experience the practical 
benefi ts of increased trade, domestic pressures are likely to push for further 
reforms, setting these countries on the path to increased growth and prosper-
ity at their own pace and on their own terms. Over time, the United States 
should reinforce these positive market-based trends through the appropriate 
use of grants targeting institutional development and market-strengthening 
initiatives to support expanded trade. The main disadvantage to this option is 
that it might shift some trade away from other countries such as Indonesia or 
the Philippines, where signifi cant terrorist concerns also exist.
Another option is to drop the movement toward individual FTAs or a 
MEFTA and focus on bringing the current WTO round to a successful con-
clusion. In many ways, this would be a far more diffi cult task for the United 
States, but one with greater economic rewards for both the United States and 
the Middle East as a whole.
The fi nancial implications of completing this trade round are staggering. A 
recent World Bank study projected that a new trade agreement would have a 
giant impact on the global economy.44 The bank’s estimate is that an accord 
promoting free trade would produce annual income growth of between $290 
billion and $520 billion. It would lift approximately 144 million people out of 
poverty by 2015. 
42. Robert Z. Lawrence and Ahmed Galal, “US-Egypt Free Trade Agreement,” Institute for Inter-
national Economics, Washington, DC, 2005.
43. Clyde Prestowitz, “Bold Action Can Still Save Doha Round: An American Initiative to Elimi-
nate Subsidies Would Break the Trade Logjam,” YaleGlobal, 19 September 2003.
44. Global Economic Prospects (2004): Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).
